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Abstract
The principle of Photo Response Non Uniformity
(PRNU) is often exploited to deduce the identity of the
smartphone device whose camera or sensor was used to ac-
quire a certain image. In this work, we design an algorithm
that perturbs a face image acquired using a smartphone
camera such that (a) sensor-specific details pertaining to
the smartphone camera are suppressed (sensor anonymiza-
tion); (b) the sensor pattern of a different device is in-
corporated (sensor spoofing); and (c) biometric matching
using the perturbed image is not affected (biometric util-
ity). We employ a simple approach utilizing Discrete Co-
sine Transform to achieve the aforementioned objectives.
Experiments conducted on the MICHE-I and OULU-NPU
datasets, which contain periocular and facial data acquired
using 12 smartphone cameras, demonstrate the efficacy of
the proposed de-identification algorithm on three different
PRNU-based sensor identification schemes. This work has
application in sensor forensics and personal privacy.
1. Introduction
Sensor identification, or source attribution, [6] refers to
the automated deduction of sensor identity from a digital
image. Photo Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU) based
sensor identification algorithms have been successfully used
in the context of RGB [24, 13, 29] and near-infrared
(NIR) [18, 20, 2] images. PRNU based sensor identifica-
tion algorithms typically use image denoising techniques to
elicit sensor specific details from an image. The forensic
utility of these algorithms has been well established in the
literature [14].
Since smartphone devices are intricately linked to their
owners, sensor identification using images from smartphone
cameras can inevitably lead to person identification. This
poses privacy concerns to the general populace [1] and, es-
pecially, to photojournalists [28]. Sensor de-identification
can mitigate such concerns by removing sensor specific
traces from the image. A number of sensor de-identification
algorithms, particularly in the context of PRNU suppres-
sion, have been developed in the literature [12, 32]. PRNU
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Figure 1: The objective of our work. The original biometric
image is modified such that the sensor classifier associates
it with a different sensor, while the biometric matcher suc-
cessfully matches the original image with the modified im-
age.
suppression can be done by either PRNU anonymization or
PRNU spoofing.
PRNU anonymization is typically accomplished using
strong filtering schemes [11] that perturb the PRNU pat-
tern, or irreversible transformations such as ‘seam carv-
ing’ [12] that systematically remove rows and columns from
the image. This produces geometrical perturbations which
impair correct source attribution. In [23], the authors per-
formed ‘Signature Removal’ by subtracting a scaled version
of the PRNU signature (sensor reference pattern) from an
image. For an original image, I , belonging to sensor S, the
PRNU anonynimized image is obtained as I′ = I − γKˆS .
Here, γ is the scaling factor for the sensor reference pattern
KˆS . PRNU spoofing, on the other hand, involves delib-
erately confounding the image such that a sensor classifier
attributes it to a different target sensor rather than the ac-
tual source sensor. This can be achieved by injecting the
PRNU pattern of the target sensor directly into the test im-
age [15]. The modified image becomes I′ = [I+I×γKˆT ].
Here, I is the original image and KˆT is the reference pat-
tern of the target sensor T . The term γ is a scalar parame-
ter that needs to be empirically tuned to achieve the spoof-
ing. Alternatively, one can first subtract the reference pat-
tern or the ‘fingerprint’ of the source sensor and then in-
sert the target sensor pattern; this is known as ‘Signature
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Substitution’ [23]. The modified image is represented as
I′ = I − γKˆS + βKˆT . I belongs to the source sensor
S, whose reference pattern is KˆS . The terms γ and β are
scalars which can be optimized through grid-line search.
Majority of the work discussed above focus on images
depicting natural scenes. However, for biometric images
(face, iris, fingerprints), the perturbations may degrade the
quality of the samples making them unsuitable for person
recognition. Limited work has been done in the context
of sensor de-identification for biometric samples [31].
In [4], the authors proposed an iterative perturbation
algorithm, which applied patch-wise modifications to the
input biometric image to perform sensor de-identification
while retaining its biometric utility. Current methods
utilize parameters optimized through exhaustive search
techniques and require computation of sensor reference
patterns to achieve sensor de-identification [15, 23, 31].
Semi-adversarial learning [27] based methods can be
another viable way to accomplish sensor de-identification
while retaining biometric matching utility. However, such
methods are complex and require a large number of training
images. The objective of our work is to develop a rather
simple method to perform sensor de-identification,
while preserving the biometric recognition utility of the
images. The key idea is illustrated in Figure 1. The merits
of the proposed method are as follows.
1. Designing a sensor de-identification algorithm that can
perform both PRNU anonymization and PRNU spoofing in
a non-iterative fashion. This addresses the computational
overhead incurred by the algorithms in [11, 4].
2. The proposed de-identification algorithm is applicable to
different PRNU estimation schemes and works irrespective
of the source and target sensors. This eliminates the need
for parameter optimization and computation of the refer-
ence patterns corresponding to each pair of source and tar-
get sensors as required in [15, 23].
3. The proposed algorithm causes minimal degradation to
the biometric content of the images, thus retaining their bio-
metric utility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 discusses the concept of PRNU that has been used for
sensor identification from images. Section 3 describes the
proposed algorithm for PRNU anonymization and PRNU
spoofing. In section 4, we describe the dataset, the exper-
imental protocol and the results. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2. Photo Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU)
Photo Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU) [24] manifests
due to anomalies present in the silicon wafer used during
sensor fabrication. PRNU is a type of sensor pattern noise
which arises due to the variation in the response of the pix-
Algorithm 1: PRNU Anonymization.
Input: An image I of size h× w and parameter η
Output: PRNU anonymized image I′
1 Apply 2-dimensional DCT to I
Idct = DCT (I)
2 Computem = min(h,w) and α = round(η ×m)
3 Extract the high frequency components as follows:
Ihigh = High(Idct, α),
where, theHigh(·, ·) operator extracts the lower triangular portion of the
DCT coefficients along the anti-diagonal direction, regulated by α
4 Extract the low frequency components as follows: Ilow = Idct − Ihigh
5 Apply inverse DCT to obtain the modified image I′ = DCT−1(Ilow)
6 Return the modified image I′
els across the sensor plane to the same light intensity and
is intrinsically linked to each sensor. Therefore, PRNU can
be used for sensor identification. Sensor identification using
PRNU requires the computation of the sensor reference pat-
tern from a set of training images acquired using a specific
sensor. When an unknown test image is provided, the noise
residual of that image is computed and correlated with the
reference pattern of several different sensors. The test im-
age is attributed to the sensor whose reference pattern yields
the highest correlation value.
While a number of algorithms have been proposed in the
literature to perform sensor identification [3, 25], in this
work we will focus on 3 of them — (i) Enhanced PRNU
Estimation, (ii) Maximum Likelihood based PRNU Estima-
tion and (iii) Phase PRNU Estimation methods — as these 3
fundamental PRNU based methods have been widely used
in the literature. Each method generates the sensor refer-
ence pattern from a set of training images as described be-
low.
1. Enhanced PRNU Estimation: The reference pattern is
computed as an average of the noise residuals correspond-
ing to the training images [22].
2. Maximum Likelihood based PRNU Estimation (MLE
PRNU): The noise residuals from the training set are
weighted by the images and normalized by the sum of the
squares of the pixel intensity values of the training im-
ages [9], and furthermore, subjected to Wiener filtering and
zero-mean operations to remove interpolation artifacts.
3. Phase PRNU Estimation: The phase component of the
PRNU is computed in the Fourier domain and then aver-
aged across the training images [19] to generate the refer-
ence pattern.
The test noise residual can be extracted by either sim-
ply applying a wavelet based denoising filter to the test im-
age or by applying an enhancement model to further atten-
uate scene influences, as done in Enhanced PRNU Estima-
tion [22].
3. Proposed Method
Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) has been successfully
used for lossy image compression [33] or for improving
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Figure 2: Illustration of PRNU Anonymization. The DCT
coefficients are arranged such that the top-left portion has
the low frequency components while the bottom-right por-
tion encapsulates the high frequency information. The
PRNU anonymized image is the result of suppression of
high frequency components (see Algorithm 1, here η =
0.9).
Figure 3: Illustration of PRNU Spoofing. The high fre-
quency components in the original image are suppressed
first, the residue being the low frequency components. The
high frequency components of the target sensor are further
computed from the candidate images, and added to the low
frequency components of the original image, resulting in
the PRNU spoofed image (see Algorithm 2, here η = 0.7).
source camera identification [7]. The coefficients located
in the top-left portion capture the low frequency compo-
nents while the bottom-right coefficients encode the high
frequency components. Our goal is to modify the im-
ages to perturb the PRNU pattern resulting in sensor de-
identification. PRNU is a noise-like component which is
dominated by the high frequency components present in
an image. Thus, we propose to transform the image into
the DCT domain and modulate the DCT coefficients such
that the high frequency components are suppressed, while
retaining the low frequency components. By suppressing
the high frequency components, we mask the sensor pattern
present in the image. On the other hand, we retain the low
frequency components which primarily contain the scene
details in the image. The scene details are pivotal for bio-
metric recognition. Thus, we ensure preservation of the bio-
metric utility of the image. We then apply the inverse DCT,
and the output is the modified image.
To achieve sensor de-identification we perform both (i)
PRNU Anonymization and (ii) PRNU Spoofing.
PRNU Anonymization: Given an image I , we first sub-
ject it to DCT to yield Idct. We intend to suppress the high
Algorithm 2: PRNU Spoofing.
Input: An image I of size h× w belonging to source sensor S, a set ofN
candidate images belonging to the target sensor T , where each image
of size p× q is denoted asGi (i = [1, · · · , N ]) and η
Output: PRNU spoofed image I′
1 Set i = 1
2 Apply 2-dimensional DCT to I , Idct = DCT (I)
3 Extract the low frequency and high frequency components, Ilow and Ihigh
as described in Algorithm 1 and set Ihigh = 0
4 Compute α = round(η ×min(p, q))
5 repeat
7 – Apply 2-dimensional DCT toGi,Gidct = DCT (G
i)
9 – Extract the high frequency components as follows:
Gihigh = High(G
i
dct, α)
11 – Apply inverse DCT to the high frequency content as follows:
G′i = DCT
−1(Gihigh)
13 – Add the images to generate Thigh+ = G′i and increment i+ = 1
14 until i = N ;
15 Divide by the number of images Thigh =
Thigh
N
16 Resize Thigh to h× w using bicubic interpolation
17 Apply inverse DCT to obtain the modified image
I′ = DCT−1(Thigh + Ilow)
18 Return the modified image I′
frequency information without impairing the low frequency
details. To achieve this goal, we define a parameter α that
serves as a regulator for high frequency suppression. α is
computed as the product of the minimum of the height and
width of the image min(h,w), and a user-defined param-
eter η, rounded off to the nearest integer. All DCT coeffi-
cients present in the interval [row = α : h, col = α : w] are
set to zero. Thus, α represents the threshold for the suppres-
sion of the DCT coefficients, and that threshold is a function
of the image dimensions. We discard the high frequency
components and then apply inverse DCT which results in
the PRNU anonymized image I′. The steps are described
in Algorithm 1. The process of PRNU anonymization is
illustrated using an example image in Figure 2.
PRNU Spoofing: We want the sensor classifier to assign an
image belonging to source sensor S to a specific target sen-
sor T . To accomplish this task, we perform the following
steps.
(i) First, we compute the parameter α. Next, we transform
the original image I from the source sensor to the DCT
domain and then extract its low frequency components (as
done in Algorithm 1).
(ii) A set of N candidate images, Gi, i = [1, · · · , N ], be-
longing to the target sensor is selected, and each of them is
subjected to DCT resulting inGidct (see Section 4.2). Next,
we extract the high frequency coefficients from each Gidct,
apply inverse DCT, and then compute their average to yield
Thigh. This averaged output represents the sensor traces of
the target sensor.
(iii) Finally, we insert the averaged high frequency coeffi-
cients into I to generate I′ which will now be classified as
belonging to the target sensor, resulting in PRNU spoofing.
The implementation details for PRNU spoofing are de-
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Table 1: Dataset specifications. The top block corresponds to MICHE-I dataset [26] and the bottom block corresponds to
OULU-NPU face dataset [8]. In the MICHE-I dataset, we denote the brand Apple as ‘Device 1’ and the brand Samsung as
‘Device 2’. Two different smartphones belonging to the same brand and model, e.g., Apple iPhone5, are distinguished as
‘UNIT I’ and ‘UNIT II’.
Smartphone Brand and Model Device Identifier Sensor Image Size
Number of Images/
Number of Subjects
(Training Set)
Number of Images/
Number of Subjects
(Test Set)
Apple iPhone 5 Device 1UNIT I
Front (F) 960×1280 55/7 344/41
Rear (R) 1536×2048 55/7 355/41
Apple iPhone 5 Device 1UNIT II
Front (F) 960×1280 55/6 164/20
Rear (R) 2448×3264 55/6 170/20
Samsung Galaxy
S4
Device 2
UNIT I
Front (F) 1080×1920 55/5 577/69
Rear (R) 2322×4128 55/5 600/70
Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge — Front (F) 1080×1920 55/6 0/0
HTC Desire EYE — Front (F) 1080×1920 55/6 0/0
MEIZU X5 — Front (F) 1080×1920 55/6 0/0
ASUS Zenfone Selfie — Front (F) 1080×1920 55/6 0/0
Sony XPERIA C5 Ultra Dual — Front (F) 1080×1920 55/6 0/0
Oppo N3 — Front (F) 1080×1920 55/6 0/0
TOTAL 660/72 2,210/261
scribed in Algorithm 2. The process of PRNU spoofing is
illustrated using an example image in Figure 3.
4. Experiments and Results
4.1. Dataset
We used the Mobile Iris Challenge Evaluation (MICHE-
I) dataset [26] and the OULU-NPU face dataset [8, 21] for
performing the experiments in this work. The MICHE-I
dataset comprises of over 3,000 eye images from three de-
vices: Apple iPhone 5, Samsung Galaxy S4 and Samsung
Galaxy Tab 2 [14]. However, in our work, we employed the
periocular images from two smartphones, Apple iPhone 5
and Samsung Galaxy S4, only. The authors in [14] discov-
ered that two separate units of Apple iPhone 5 were used for
data collection. We refer to them as Unit I and Unit II re-
spectively. Further, the images in the dataset were acquired
using the front and rear camera sensors, separately. Thus,
the MICHE-I dataset used in this work consists of data
from 6 sensors. The OULU-NPU face dataset comprises
of 4,950 face videos recorded using the front cameras of six
mobile devices—Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge, HTC Desire
EYE, MEIZU X5, ASUS Zenfone Selfie, Sony XPERIA
C5 Ultra Dual and OPPO N3. The videos were recorded in
three sessions with different illumination and background
scenes. We only use the bonafide face videos/images in
the OULU-NPU dataset corresponding to 6 sensors. See
Figure 4. The specifications of the dataset are described in
Table 1.
We split each dataset into a training set and a test set. We
followed a subject-disjoint protocol for creating the train-
ing and test sets. The images in the training set are used
for generating the reference pattern for each sensor, as indi-
cated in the fifth column of Table 1. Our training set consists
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 4: Example images from the MICHE-I and the
OULU-NPU datasets acquired using (a) Apple iPhone 5
Rear, (b) Samsung Galaxy S4 Front, (c) Samsung Galaxy
S6 Edge Front, (d) HTC Desire EYE Front, (e) MEIZU X5
Front, (f) ASUS Zenfone Selfie Front, (g) Sony XPERIA
C5 Ultra Dual Front and (h) OPPO N3 Front sensors.
of 55 images [5] from each camera sensor in the MICHE-
I dataset. The OULU-NPU database contains videos, and
so we selected 55 frames (20 frames from the first session,
20 frames from the second, and 15 frames from the third)
from 6 subjects, for each of the 6 sensors. The test set com-
prises of images belonging to the MICHE-I dataset only
(see the last column in Table 1). Thus, our dataset consists
of 2,870 images corresponding to 333 subjects acquired us-
ing 12 camera sensors. Next, we describe the experiments
conducted in this work.
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4.2. Experimental Methodology
For the sensor de-identification experiments, we first
computed the sensor reference patterns from the traning set
for each of the 12 sensors (see Table 1) using the three
PRNU estimation schemes viz., Enhanced PRNU, MLE
PRNU and Phase PRNU. Next, we used a small number
of images (=10) as the validation set to compute the pa-
rameter η = [0, 1] to be used for PRNU anonymization
and PRNU spoofing, separately. We estimated η = 0.9
for PRNU anonymization and η = 0.7 for PRNU spoof-
ing. The test experiments were conducted on images be-
longing to the MICHE-I dataset only. However, the eval-
uation process involved all the 12 sensor reference pat-
terns. The experiments evaluated three PRNU estimation
schemes: Enhanced PRNU,1 MLE PRNU and Phase PRNU
methods. We used normalized cross-correlation for sen-
sor identification. For the PRNU spoofing experiments, the
source and target sensors were from the MICHE-I dataset
and were either both front or both rear sensors. Thus, there
were 2 × 3P 2 = 12 PRNU spoofing experiments. Due to
the significant difference in resolutions between the front
and rear sensors of smartphones, we did not perform front-
to-rear or rear-to-front spoofing. We selected N , i.e., the
number of candidate images belonging to the target sensor
(see Algorithm 2), to be the number of test images for that
sensor (see the last column in Table 1).
For the biometric matching experiments, we considered
a periocular matcher, as many of the images used in this
work are partial face images. We employed the ResNet-
101 [16] architecture pre-trained on ImageNet [10] dataset
for performing periocular matching. We utilized the fea-
tures from layer 170 which were shown to perform the best
for periocular matching in [17]. We applied Contrast Lim-
ited Adaptive Histogram Equalization (CLAHE) to the im-
ages before feeding them to the convolutional neural net-
work. We used the cosine similarity for computing the
match score between the probe and gallery images. We per-
formed three sets of matching experiments, viz., (i) original:
both probe and gallery images comprise of unmodified im-
ages, (ii) after: both probe and gallery images comprise of
modified images and (iii) cross: the gallery images are the
original samples while the probe images are the modified
images and the genuine scores are computed by utilizing
2 sample images (belonging to the same subject), i.e., the
original image and the modified image; the impostor scores
are computed by taking pairs of samples belonging to differ-
ent subjects. Furthermore, we conducted experiments sep-
arately for the two acquisition settings in this database: In-
door and Outdoor.
1We employed Enhancement Model III and we set the user defined
threshold to 6 [22, 5].
4.3. Results
For the sensor de-identification experiments, we used
sensor identification accuracy as the evaluation metric for
PRNU anonymization and the spoof success rate (SSR) as
the evaluation metric for the PRNU spoofing algorithm. For
PRNU anonymization, we first compute the sensor iden-
tification accuracy of the original images. Before pertur-
bation, the images are assigned to the correct sensor with
high accuracies by all three PRNU estimation schemes
(see ‘Original’ column in Table 2). Next, when the sen-
sor classifier accepts the modified images as input, the re-
sults indicate a significant degradation in the sensor iden-
tification accuracy for a majority of the cases (see ‘After’
column in Table 2). The differences in the sensor iden-
tification accuracies before and after perturbation are re-
ported in the ‘Change’ column in Table 2. An average
difference (change) of 82.77% in the sensor identification
accuracies between pre- and post-perturbed images is ob-
served for all the three PRNU estimation schemes evalu-
ated in this work (Enhanced PRNU: 85.75%, MLE PRNU:
83.20% and Phase PRNU: 79.36%). The results indicate
successful PRNU anonymization thereby ensuring sensor
de-identification.
The second set of results, pertaining to PRNU spoofing,
reports the SSR for the perturbed images. SSR computes
the proportion of perturbed images that are assigned to the
target sensor. The results in Table 3 indicate successful
spoofing with respect to all the PRNU estimation schemes
considered in this work. An average SSR of 99.48% is
observed when evaluated using Enhanced PRNU, 99.64%
when evaluated using MLE PRNU, and 99.28% when eval-
uated using Phase PRNU for all 12 PRNU spoofing experi-
ments. The proposed spoofing experiment fails to confound
the Phase PRNU estimation scheme, particularly when the
source sensor is the rear sensor of Device 1 UNIT I and
the target sensor is the rear sensor of Device 1 UNIT II.
Upon analysis, we observed that the original images belong-
ing to Device 1 UNIT II rear sensor resulted in the lowest
sensor identification accuracy for all three PRNU estima-
tion schemes (see Table 2). We speculate that the images
may contain some artifacts that are interfering with reliable
PRNU estimation as well as the spoofing process. There-
fore, we performed another experiment where we increased
the value of η from 0.7 to 0.9 for that particular spoofing ex-
periment and we observed that the SSR increased to 100%
for all 3 PRNU estimation schemes. However, visual anal-
ysis reveals that the spoofed images resulting from the two
different values of η have perceptible differences (η = 0.9
results in a more blurred image than when η = 0.7 is used).
Finally, we studied the performance of our PRNU spoofing
algorithm when a smaller number of candidate images, N ,
is employed (50%, 10% and 1% of the test set). Surpris-
ingly, even when only 1% of the test set is used as candi-
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Table 2: Performance of the proposed algorithm for PRNU Anonymization in terms of sensor identification accuracy (%).
Results are evaluated using 3 PRNU estimation schemes. ‘Original’ corresponds to sensor identification using images prior
to perturbation. ‘After’ corresponds to sensor identification using images after perturbation and ‘Change’ indicates the differ-
ence between the ‘Original’ and ‘After’ sensor identification accuracies. A high positive value in the ‘Change’ field indicates
successful PRNU Anonymization.
Device Identifier Sensors Enhanced PRNU MLE PRNU Phase PRNUOriginal After Change Original After Change Original After Change
Device 1 UNIT I Front 99.71 18.31 81.40 99.71 17.73 81.98 99.71 22.67 77.04Rear 99.51 16.06 83.45 97.32 16.06 81.26 98.05 21.69 76.36
Device 1 UNIT II Front 96.34 21.34 75 96.34 25.61 70.73 93.90 26.83 67.07Rear 94.71 11.76 82.95 88.24 14.12 74.12 87.65 11.76 75.89
Device 2 UNIT I Front 100 3.81 96.19 100 5.72 94.28 100 13.69 86.31Rear 100 4.50 95.50 100 3.17 96.83 100 6.50 93.50
AVERAGE 85.75 83.20 79.36
Table 3: Performance of the proposed algorithm for PRNU Spoofing in terms of spoof success rate (SSR). Results are
evaluated using 3 PRNU estimation schemes. A high SSR value indicates successful spoofing.
Source Sensor Target Sensor Spoof Success Rate (%)Enhanced PRNU MLE PRNU Phase PRNU
Device 1 UNIT I
FRONT
Device 1 UNIT II FRONT 100 100 100
Device 2 UNIT I FRONT 96.80 100 100
Device 1 UNIT II
FRONT
Device 1 UNIT I FRONT 100 100 100
Device 2 UNIT I FRONT 97.56 100 100
Device 2 UNIT I
FRONT
Device 1 UNIT I FRONT 100 100 100
Device 1 UNIT II FRONT 100 100 100
Device 1 UNIT I
REAR
Device 1 UNIT II REAR 100 100 94.08
Device 2 UNIT I REAR 99.44 96.90 97.46
Device 1 UNIT II
REAR
Device 1 UNIT I REAR 100 100 100
Device 2 UNIT I REAR 100 98.82 100
Device 2 UNIT I
REAR
Device 1 UNIT I REAR 100 100 100
Device 1 UNIT II REAR 100 100 99.83
AVERAGE 99.48 99.64 99.28
date images, i.e., N = 4, we observed an average SSR of
99.6% across the three PRNU estimation schemes. How-
ever, the spoofed images are significantly degraded as they
contain some spurious scene details from the candidate im-
ages (possibly, the averaging operation in Step 17 of Al-
gorithm 2 suppresses scene details more aggressively for a
high value of N ).
Next, we report the results for the periocular biometric
recognition experiments. The periocular matching experi-
ments indicate the preservation of the biometric utility of
the images in both PRNU anonymized images and PRNU
spoofed images. The ROC curves corresponding to ‘Orig-
inal’ and ‘After’ matching experiments are within 1% of
each other. Figure 5 presents the ROC curves for images
subjected to PRNU anonymization. Note that Samsung
Galaxy S4 results in overall lower periocular matching per-
formance even for the original images. The cross-matching
experiments result in perfect match (100%) for a majority
of the cases barring the Samsung Galaxy S4 sensor. The
suppression of the high frequency components may also re-
sult in removal of edges and other details which can impact
the matching performance. For the PRNU spoofing exper-
iments, we have presented the ROC matching curves for
each smartphone device or unit used in this work in Fig-
ures 6, 7 and 8. The matching experiments show that the
perturbation scheme used for PRNU spoofing does not de-
grade the biometric recognition performance.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we design an algorithm that perturbs a face
image acquired using a smartphone camera such that (a)
sensor-specific details pertaining to the smartphone cam-
era are suppressed (sensor anonymization); (b) the sensor
noise pattern of a different device is incorporated (sensor
spoofing); and (c) biometric matching using the perturbed
image is not affected (biometric utility). We achieve this by
applying the Discrete Cosine Transform to images and fur-
ther modulating the DCT coefficients to either attain PRNU
anonymization or PRNU spoofing. In contrast to exist-
ing methods which involve computation of sensor reference
patterns and exhaustive parameter optimization [15, 23, 31],
the proposed method is simple and can achieve highly
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Front-Indoor Front-Outdoor Rear-Indoor Rear-Outdoor
(a)
Front-Indoor Front-Outdoor Rear-Indoor Rear-Outdoor
(b)
Front-Indoor Front-Outdoor Rear-Indoor Rear-Outdoor
(c)
Figure 5: ROC curves for matching PRNU Anonymized images. Each row corresponds to a different device identifier: (a)
Device 1 UNIT I, (b) Device 1 UNIT II and (c) Device 2 UNIT I.
Front-Indoor Front-Outdoor Rear-Indoor Rear-Outdoor
(a)
Front-Indoor Front-Outdoor Rear-Indoor Rear-Outdoor
(b)
Figure 6: ROC curves for matching PRNU Spoofed images. Here, the source sensor is Device 1 UNIT I. In this case, the
target sensors are: (a) Device 1 UNIT II (top row) and (b) Device 2 UNIT I (bottom row).
7
Front-Indoor Front-Outdoor Rear-Indoor Rear-Outdoor
(a)
Front-Indoor Front-Outdoor Rear-Indoor Rear-Outdoor
(b)
Figure 7: ROC curves for matching PRNU Spoofed images. Here, the source sensor is Device 1 UNIT II. In this case, the
target sensors are: (a) Device 1 UNIT I (top row) and (b) Device 2 UNIT I (bottom row).
Front-Indoor Front-Outdoor Rear-Indoor Rear-Outdoor
(a)
Front-Indoor Front-Outdoor Rear-Indoor Rear-Outdoor
(b)
Figure 8: ROC curves for matching PRNU Spoofed images. Here, the source sensor is Device 2 UNIT I. In this case, the
target sensors are: (a) Device 1 UNIT I (top row) and (b) Device 1 UNIT II (bottom row).
promising results. In our experiments, we considered face
(partial and full) images acquired using the front and rear
cameras of different smartphones resulting in data from a
total of 12 camera sensors. Our proposed method results
in successful camera de-identification for images without
compromising the biometric matching performance. An av-
erage of ≈ 82.8% reduction in sensor identification is re-
ported in the case of PRNU anonymization, and an average
spoof success rate of≈ 99.5% is observed for PRNU spoof-
ing across the three PRNU estimation schemes evaluated in
this work.
Future work will consider data from a larger number
of sensors to evaluate the proposed algorithm. More-
over, the impact of different denoising and PRNU estima-
tion algorithms will be evaluated to study the robustness
of the proposed method. Finally, we will explore meth-
ods to make sensor identification schemes resilient to de-
identification [30].
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